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Peter Nedergaard  11. Introduction: In search for a theoretical model of the common agricultural policy 
The aim of this article is to propose a theoretical model for analysing the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union. The arguments for proposing a specific 
theoretical model for the CAP are several: a) The co-operation in the agricultural policy 
field of the European Union is the oldest and the most developed area of supranational co-
operation which has created a large number of characteristic path dependencies, b) the CAP 
is based on an economic sector with some rather peculiar economic characteristics which 
have to be considered in the theoretical model, and c) the CAP also has some specific 
characteristics as far as the interest organisations in the sector are concerned. 
 
Whether or not a theory is a good theory depends on the criteria against which theories 
might be evaluated. Burchill (1996: 24) has proposed a set of criteria for an evaluation of 
an international relations theory: its understanding of an issue or a process, its explanatory 
power, its success at predicting events, its consistency and coherence, its scope, and its 
capacity for self-reflection and engagement with contending theories. At the end of this 
article, the usefulness of the proposed theoretical model will be evaluated against these 
criteria. 
 
Analysis of European Union affairs often has its roots in the neofunctionalist integration 
theory. Neofunctionalism was built around the proposition that an international society of 
states can acquire the procedural characteristics of a domestic political system (Rosamond, 
2000: 56) through a number of “political” and “technical” spill-overs. Already Lindberg 
noted that groups “may change their political organization and tactics in order to gain 
access to, and influence, such new central decision-making centres as may be developing” 
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neofunctionalism failed to acknowledge the importance of external factors for European 
integration (Hansen, 1969), and that it failed to identify the dependent variable of 
functional economic integration (Haas, 1971). Both of these criticisms will have to be taken 
into account in the proposed theoretical model of the Common Agricultural Policy in this 
article. 
 
Neofunctionalism has also been criticised by the intergovernmentalist. But whereas this 
criticism focused on the so-called history-making moments such as treaty revisions or 
major crisis in the European Union it has itself often neglected the day-to-day politics 
within the European Union political system. Hence, more and more scholars have argued 
for a greater use of public policy literature (for example Hix 1999, Pollack 2003, 
Richardson 1996) due to the fact that the EU political system has become more and more a 
“normal” political system. This can be seen from the fact that the policy-making process in 
the European Union is more and more characterised by conflicts over redistribution, 
regulation, and stabilisation with the active participance of interested actors as well as 
Member States and where, so far, the regulatory functions have been dominating (Majone, 
1996). 
 
Clearly, in the analysis of the European Union, institutions become important, partly 
because the Union is itself a highly institutionalised form of co-operation, partly and more 
fundamentally, because institutions are necessary preconditions for understanding how 
actors can conduct higher proportion of positive sum bargains which can be seen as an 
updated and more narrowly defined version of the spill-over concept. As a matter of fact, 
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as an ideal testing ground for various forms of institutional analysis. 
 
Generally, institutional analyses are subdivided into historical and rational choice variants 
(Bulmer, 1994). Rational choice institutionalism tends to define institutions as formal 
legalistic entities and sets of decision rules that impose obligations upon self-interested 
political actors. In a European context this focus often seems reasonable because it reflects 
the fact that formal institutional set-ups and decision-making rules play such a dominant 
role in the European integration discourse.  
 
On the other hand, historical institutionalists are normally associated with a more “broad” 
interpretation of the influence of institutions as they also govern the wider context within 
which political action occurs. Among other things, historical institutionalism stresses the 
tendencies of institutions to create path dependencies. In the context of European 
integration, historical institutionalists tend to argue that the construction of supranational 
institutions and a specific set of supranational policies were rooted in a very particular 
historical context. At the same time, the very act of creating particular sorts of institutions 
with particular sorts of instruments unleashed logics that could not necessarily be predicted 
at the time (Rosamond, 2000: 117). Again, this can be seen as a way to put a new label on 
the classical spill-over concept. 
 
However, there is no necessary incompatibility between rational choice institutionalism and 
historical institutionalism as, for example, the historically constructed institutions and the 
resulting path dependencies can be seen as exogenous constraints to the preferences of 
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article tries to demonstrate that, in order to create a theoretical model of the Common 
Agricultural Policy of the European Union, rational choice institutionalism will benefit 
from integrating the insights of historical institutionalism. 
 
Basically, in this article it is argued that the Common Agricultural Policy can only be 
understood and explained if the economic analysis is coupled to an analysis of the political 
decision-making process and the political system as proposed in rational choice theory. 
Here, it has to be taken into account that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) means 
that the European Union can be considered as one multi-level governance system in the 
agricultural policy area where the Member States function as integrated elements of the 
internal decision-making asymmetries that are, according to the rational choice theorists, 
always found in democratic political systems. The theories mentioned are used in order to 
establish a theoretical model for analyzing the CAP covering both the economic and the 
political system.  
 
In order to establish a theoretical model of the CAP, welfare economics and the concept of 
market failure becomes important as a precondition for explaining why such a strong 
regulatory framework of the CAP was set up. However, in contrast to much economics 
literature the independent variable in the explanation of the Common Agricultural Policy is 
not found in the economic characteristics alone. Therefore, in section 2 below the concept 
of welfare economics and market failure with regard to the agricultural economic is 
explained and proposed as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the political 
construction of the CAP. Hence, in section 3 the parallel concepts rational choice and the 
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features of the theoretical model of the CAP is explained whereas the rest of the article 
elaborates on the various elements of this model. 
 
 2. Welfare economics and market failures 
Agricultural politics and agricultural economics have for many years been the object of 
study by economic theory in order to explain (and sometimes even justify) the existing 
agricultural policies and also to propose policy instruments which are the most optimal 
ones according to the theory. For example, based upon welfare economic theory, analyses 
have been made of which political instruments the governments should use in order to 
maximise economic welfare. According to welfare economic theory, market imperfections 
can be corrected through public expenditures and public regulations if only it is based upon 
a rational and scientific planning (Randall, 1985). Following this line of reasoning there are 
lots of proposals on how to solve the market imperfections of the agricultural economic 
system: direct income support, regional labour market policies, elimination of price support 
policies etc. These proposals have been on the table for many years as methods to correct 
the market imperfections in a rational, scientific and welfare economic optimal way. What 
is common to all these proposals is that they as traditional welfare economic theory, 
generally, have so-called market failures as their starting point.  
 
Over the years, many economists have tried to explain the various agricultural policies of 
the developed countries on the basis of a variation of the welfare economic theory like, for 
example, public economic theory. Munk (2004) is a representative of this theoretical 
school. He explains the supportive agricultural policies as a more or less “pure” function of 
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exporters of agricultural products tend to provide support at a higher level than countries 
which are importers) and b) the level of difference between the income of farmers and non-
farmers. The assumptions made in this explanatory model are that the behaviour of the 
political system is an outcome of the maximation of a social welfare function based on 
egalitarian value preferences and that these preferences are relatively stable. 
 
This economic “functionalist” explanatory model of the agricultural policies, however, 
seems unable to answer a number of questions about the characteristics of agriculture in 
general and the Common Agricultural Policy in particular. If agricultural support is a 
“pure” function of certain economic characteristics, why should farmers then invest so 
many resources in lobbying the agricultural political decision-makers? At the same time, if 
the low incomes are the explanation, why do other low income groups not receive the same 
amount of support like the farming group? Besides, if claiming that low incomes is the 
explanation of the Common Agricultural Policy, how does this correspondent to the fact 
that 20 per cent of the wealthiest farmers receive nearly 80 per cent of the total agricultural 
support included in the CAP? Finally, if the position as net exporter is the explanation, why 
are other net exporters not supported the same way as agriculture is supported. It seems as 
if the correlation between the position as a low income group and the position as net 
exporters is like the correlation between their numbers of storks and the new born children 
in the various municipalities of Sweden always mentioned in old introductionary books on 
statistics. There might be a correlation beween the number of storks and babies in the 
municipalities in  Sweden, but the reason for this correlation has to be found somewhere 
else. 
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Hence, over the last 30 years, the welfare economic theory has been criticised with 
increasing strength as an insufficient basis for explaining the agricultural policies of the 
developed countries. When the theory of market failures is used as an argument in favour 
of public regulations and when it is used in favour of public interventions one risks 
disregarding the existence of so-called government failures or political failures (Besley, 
2004). This concept was originally invented by James M. Buchanan (1979) in order to 
describe inefficiencies and waste of resources as a result of government interventions.  
 
Therefore, instead of using economic theory as the sole basis for explaining the agricultural 
policies of the developed countries and, thereby, overlooking all characteristic features of 
the political system, political actors should be included in the explanations of the 
agricultural policies. This means that the political black box should be opened, which also 
imply that the altruistic assumptions about the political actors should be revised because it 
becomes openly illogical to model actors in the economic system as self-interested whereas 
the same actors striving for the same benefits in the political system are modelled as 
altruists.   
 
Not least when it comes to the CAP, criticism of the welfare economic theory used as the 
sole explanation of the policy has been strong. The reason is not that the instruments and 
objectives in the CAP are in any way different from what is found in most other developed 
countries. The reason is rather that the CAP is scrutinised with great interest by many 
actors outside of the European Union because the European Union has become a major 
player in the international markets for agricultural goods.  
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The US Department of Agriculture (e.g. 2001) has often analysed the impact of the CAP on 
production and trade. Among other things, they conclude that the CAP has considerable 
impact on the world markets and that the world market prices have decreased and become 
more unstable as a result and forced a considerable contraction elsewhere. They also point 
to the welfare losses for European Member States as well as for traditional exporters of 
agricultural products outside of the European Union.  
 
Many scholars have proposed that the CAP should be more focused. Among others Koester 
(1991) proposed that agricultural policies in the industrialised states must improve first and 
foremost the incomes of farmers. The explanation is that in the long run price support 
policies cannot improve the remuneration of the agricultural labour force. At the same time, 
the price support policy has a number of negative consequences in other areas. Therefore, 
the CAP has to be changed according to Koester. After an examination of agricultural 
objectives, instruments and their impact, Robinson (1989) concluded that agricultural 
support is often capitalised in the prices of agricultural property and, therefore, the benefits 
to coming generations of farmers are limited. Piccinini and Loseby (2001) proposed a dual 
set of instruments for the CAP: one set to be used in their role as producers and one set as 
producers of services, as “guardians of the environment”.  
 
In short, the CAP has been heavily criticised for many years. The objectives of the CAP 
often contradict each other. The policy instruments often fail to reach their objectives, and 
sometimes, the developments of the CAP have even moved in the opposite direction of the 
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theoretical model.  
 
3. Rational choice and government failures  
Alongside the criticism of the welfare economic approach, the rational choice theory has 
been established as an independent theory about the political decision-making process. In 
this connection the welfare economic theory is regarded as a useable theory about the 
economic system while the rational choice theory is regarded as a fruitful theory about the 
political system. 
 
The basic idea in rational choice analysis is to draw out implications of rational self-interest 
– which is the basis for analysis in the economic system - for political interactions (Besley, 
2004). According to Buchanen (1979) individuals must be modelled as seeking to further 
their own narrow self-interest, narrowly defined, in terms of measured net wealth position, 
as predicted or expected.  
 
The rational choice theory is also a theory in rapid development. According to Buchanan 
(1979) the first phase of the theory was from the end of the 1950s and until the mid-1970s. 
In this period the so-called demand-models dominated. These models were highly 
influenced by the micro economic supply and demand models. The public sector was more 
or less regarded as a passive supplier of political decisions adapted to the demand of the 
median voter (that is the voter with preferences which mean that there are an equal number 
on each side) of the political spectrum. Therefore, the demand models of the rational choice 
theory should comprise the foundation for analysing the political process.  
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In the last 15-20 years rational choice theory has been characterised by analyses of the so-
called transformation mechanism that deals with the possible breakdown in the 
transmission of individual preferences in the political process, for example because the 
transmission is twisted around by politicians, bureaucrats and interest organizations. One 
could add that last but not least, the rational choice theory has been applied on an 
increasing number of policy areas; including European policy areas within the last 5-10 
years (see Rosamond, 2000: 118-123; and Pollack 2003). Also when analysing the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union the rational choice theory (here used 
interchangeable with the term public choice) has proved itself increasingly useful (Nello 
1984, 1997; Nedergaard 1988, 1993, 1995; Piccinini and Loseby, 2001; Moyer and Josling 
2002). This article builds, of course, on the results obtained in this research in order to 
construct a theoretical model.  
 
4. The theoretical model of the common agricultural policy  
In this article, it is argued that an analysis of the CAP will benefit from combining 
traditional welfare economic theory with rational choice theory taking into account the 
insights of historical institutionalism, neofunctionalism, and agricultural economics theory. 
In the proposed theoretical model, at the micro economic level, the unit of analysis is the 
individual decision-makers in the market, i.e. producers and consumers. If the micro 
economic model of supply and demand model is transferred to the political system, the 
relevant decision-units are the political decision-makers (politicians and bureaucrats) and 
political partners (producers and consumers) with an interest in the political decisions in 
this particular area. This is the methodological individualist foundation of the theoretical 
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consumers demand political decisions. As in neo-classical micro economic theory all 
parties are expected to maximise their utility function no matter whether the analysis is 
dealing with producers (revenue and expansion), consumers (purchasing power and 
purchasing possibilities), politicians (re-election and government power) or bureaucrats 
(power base and career possibilities).  
 
At the micro level, market failures means that economic actors become rent-seekers in the 
political system and create government failures which influence the micro economic level 
with the resulting increase in market failures. Besides, the equilibrium between suppliers 
and demanders of political decisions is dependent both on how powerful the demand is and 
on how the demand is spread between politicians, bureaucrats, producers and consumers. In 
all circumstances, it is assumed that there are a number of economic interests in the 
political system that try to build coalitions because different political decisions lead to 
different benefits and costs for the various groups in society.  
 
In figure below the arguments put forward above are collected together in a model for 
analysing the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union.  
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Figure 1. Model for analysing the common agricultural policy of the European Union. 
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          Government Failures 
  
1.  Demand Side: 
Farmers and Consumers  
 
2.  Supply Side: 
Politicians and Bureaucrats    
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
 
 
Peter Nedergaard Following the methodological individualism of the rational choice theory, the starting point 
of the theoretical model is the individual farmer producing agricultural products for the 
consumer. The economic problems he is facing brings him in contact with political 
decision-makers. To use the terminology of Albert Hirschman (1970), denied easy exit, the 
farmers exercise strong political voice. Of course, agricultural policy decisions taken by 
politicians and bureaucrats also have impact on the macro level of society, i.e. on the 
economic and political systems of the European Union as a whole.  
 
The arrows between the boxes in figure indicate structural causal relations between the two 
boxes in the theoretical model. In other words, it is assumed that market failures in the 
agricultural markets through the strong political voices of farmers trigger political 
interventions, the character of which is decided by the equilibrium between the politicians’ 
and bureaucrats’ supply of political decisions on the one hand and the farmers’ (the 
producers’) and consumers’ demands on the other hand. At the same time, this equilibrium 
is biased or asymmetric because it is dominated by the farmers demand for political 
interventions (strong demand = strong political voices) in the form of price support, income 
support, import restrictions, export restitutions etc., while the consumers as a whole only 
have few claims (weak demand = weak political voices) or a low level of interest in 
agricultural policy decisions because government interventions caused by strong interest 
organizations often make the market failures even worse. At the same time, government 
failures have an impact on market failures which they often tend to increase. 
 
The model above is a theoretical model for analysing the CAP. The model has a dynamic 
of its own. At the same time, the causal relations in the model can be put under pressure 
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within the GATT and WTO or more directly by the United States. However, it is predicted 
that such external pressures on the CAP will trigger internal reactions in the European 
Union in accordance with the theoretical model. This means that an external pressure will 
lead to changes and adjustments in the Common Agricultural Policy that are “filtered” 
through the mechanisms shown in the model. 
 
The rest of the article elaborates on the theoretical model of the Common Agricultural 
Policy in the figure above. In section 5 the market failures and their impact on the farmers 
on the supply side of the economic system is analysed whereas section 6 analyses the 
market failures on the demand side of the economic system of agriculture. Section 7 
analyses the government failures of the political system and their impact for farmers and 
consumers on the demand side of the economic system. In section 8 the government 
failures of the political system and their impact on politicians and bureaucrats on the supply 
side of the political system are analysed. Finally, section 9 contains the conclusion. 
 
5. Market failures and the supply side: Farmers  
A broad definition of market failures – at least as far as agriculture is concerned - includes 
stabilisation, allocation and income problems. The reason why the market mechanisms lead 
to these problems is certain characteristics of the supply of agricultural goods - and to a 
lesser extent of the demand of agricultural goods (cf. Hallett, 1981).  
 
The supply of agricultural goods has two main characteristics. Firstly, the farms are 
geographically spread and great in number. This implies a specific system for collection 
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houses. Furthermore, the production factors in agriculture are characterised by immobility 
and lack flexibility in response to price changes.  
 
Secondly, the supply of agricultural goods is marked by the fact that the goods (to a larger 
extent than in industry) are produced on a risk market. This reflects the lack of information 
on future prices, exchange rates and other farmers’ production (Runge and Myers, 1985). 
One reason for this is the biological nature of agricultural products. This taken alone leads 
to annually unforeseeable fluctuations in the supply of agricultural products and it leads to 
the concentration of the supply of products to certain seasons. Besides, the biological 
nature of agricultural products limits the durability of the products and makes storage and 
processing necessary.  
 
A result of the fact that agricultural products are produced on an inflexible risk market is 
that the supply is chronically unstable. This means that the supply and demand in the 
agricultural sector fluctuate more than supplies and demands in other sectors of the 
economy. This instability is often used in order to socially construct a political 
legimizations of the institutionalised public support for agriculture. In agricultural 
economics the fundamental instability of agricultural production is often illustrated by the 
so-called hog cycle.  
 
According to agricultural economics, the great number of farms also means that the 
individual producer only has a very limited proportion of the total production and therefore 
has no influence on the price of the products. In other words, the individual producer is 
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claimed that in comparison with industry, where the market is often characterised by 
oligopolistic competition, the individual farmer is in a situation with perfect competition. In 
other words, according to this view, which is cultivated by farmers and thir representatives, 
agriculture is like a perfect competition island in a sea of oligopolistic competition.  
 
The competitive situation in agriculture might be a probable explanation of parts of the 
structural income problems in the sector. At the same time, the structural income problem 
is used as another factor to construct a legitimisation of the institutionalised public support 
for agriculture. On the other hand, the specific agricultural chracteristics mentioned so far 
cannot explain the "overconsumption" of productive means that seems to take place when 
the level of incomes is considered. Rational behaviour means that the consumption of 
productive factors is decided by the point where the marginal product of increased factor 
consumption equals the marginal costs of increased factor consumption. Therefore, the 
factor consumption should fall in case of falling product prices no matter whether they are 
produced in a market with perfect or imperfect competition (Meiners and Yandle, 2003).  
 
However, the “overconsumption” of productive factors in a situation with perfect 
competition can be explained using the introduction of new technology as an example 
(Hagedorn, 1983). In the long run, the farmer cannot expect to improve his income position 
by introducing a new technology. On the other hand, he is forced to constantly introduce 
new technology in order to keep his relative income position. Perfect competition in 
agricultural markets means that the advantage of production rationalisation is widely 
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firms.  
 
Olson (1985) has also analysed the differences between agriculture and industry starting 
from the fact that agricultural firms need land. Production based on land makes co-
ordination and management more difficult in agricultural firms. Therefore, diseconomies of 
scale are reached at a much earlier point of time in agriculture than in industry. In the last 
century, very large farms existed in the United States, but these farms could not compete 
with the smaller and seemingly more efficient homesteaders. In other words, it seems that 
the optimal size of an agricultural firm is much smaller than that of an industrial firm. As a 
result, the number of farms is large enough to create a market with full competition.  
 
The many and geographically spread agricultural firms are individually owned and 
normally run by the owner and his family alone or by means of one employee. Hence, the 
variable costs are often small compared with industry. In the short run, variable costs are 
only things like fodder, fertiliser and repair costs. While wages represent the largest cost in 
many industrial firms, farmers can almost never cut costs by dismissing workers.  
 
At the same time, the costs of moving resources from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors 
have to be paid by the farmer himself. So, while the advantage of structural changes in 
agriculture is externalised, the costs are internalised (Hagedorn, 1983). In this perspective, 
the highly supportive agricultural policies in almost all industrialised countries could be 
seen as a compensation for the fact that farmers do not benefit from the structural changes 
they work so hard to accomplish. If this interpretation is diffused to the wider public and is 
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support by consumers and tax payers. At the same time, the fact that it is very costly for 
farmers to make an exit from their business is probably a necessary incentive if farmers 
have to exercise a strong political voice, however, as it will be argued in section 7, it is not 
a sufficient incentive. 
 
6. Market failures and the demand side: consumers  
Generally, the demand for agricultural goods is characterised by low income elasticity. 
According to research done by agricultural economists, the food products in the European 
Union taken as a whole have an income elasticity coefficient of about 0.2. This means that 
the consumption of food products increases by 20 per cent every time income increases by 
100 per cent. Already Adam Smith (1776) noted that one of the differences between 
agricultural goods and industrial goods is that the consumption of agricultural goods is 
limited by the size of our stomach while the consumption of industrial goods seems to be 
without limits at all.  
 
At the same time, the demand for agricultural products is characterised by small increases 
in consumption resulting from decreasing prices even though the changes in demand as a 
result of price changes differ considerably from product to product. In other words, the 
demand for agricultural products is characterised by both low income elasticities and low 
price elasticities.  
 
In the political system, the fact that agricultural goods are both necessary goods for survival 
and, at the same time, are “overmatured” products on the market with low income and price 
Peter Nedergaard  19elasticities can be exploited by farmers in their argumentation with the public - somewhat 
similar to the tradition of subsidising or protecting other “overmatured” products at the end 
of the product life cycle like ships, coal, and textiles. Again, however, beside being 
“overmatured” products, other factors must play a role, since agricultural goods are 
sugnificantly much more protected than other “overmatured” products. 
 
7. Government failures and the demand side: Farmers and consumers 
Market failures in the agricultural markets imply a fundamental insecurity in production, 
and the specific agricultural economic conditions give permanent income problems for a 
great number of farmers. This situation creates a consensus among farmers that it is 
legitimate to use the political system as an alternative way to pursue their own economic 
interests. Stated in the terms of the rational choice theory, farmers see that their economic 
profit-seeking in the market is unsuccessful. Instead, it looks as if political rent-seeking 
through organization in an interest group provides better economic pay-off (Krueger, 
1990).  
 
In order to be rational, when an economic actor decides to join or participate in an interest 
group, he has to judge whether the potential benefits exceed the foreseeable costs. Costs are 
incurred by the administration and co-ordination that is necessary in order to acquire 
political influence through an interst organization. If an economic actor belongs to a group 
with structural features which imply few organizational costs, this group must be expected 
to be easy to organise. For farmers this is a decisive factor for the strength of their group 
organization. Their preferences are similar, the size of the group is large and the sector has 
some specific economic characteristics which more or less invite potential participants to 
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Similar to other large interest groups, farmers run the risk of some members’ free-riding 
when they organise themselves in order to acquire political influence with the aim of 
enhancing common interests. Political influence has many features in common with public 
goods since it is impossible to exclude non-organised farmers from benefiting from the 
efforts made by the organised farmers. For example, all farmers in the European Union will 
benefit from a rise in the common minimum prices or increasing protectionism that are 
partly results of the political activity of the agricultural organizations.  
 
Olson (1965) was the first to point out the necessity of selective incentives if individuals 
are to participate in a collectively beneficial activity that looks like a public good. The 
selective incentives of trade-union membership in many European countries are so-called 
exclusive agreements (= all workers at a workplace have to be organised in a certain trade 
union), that the unemployment benefit system organised by the trade unions, etc. However, 
the selective incentives of the agricultural interest organizations are probably much more 
efficient. These incentives are, for example, that the publicly-financed consultative services 
of the farmers are administrated by the agricultural interest organizations and that those 
applications for different kinds of public support and milk quotas are first treated by the 
agricultural interest organizations. At the same time, the subscription fee paid by farmers is 
normally symbolic because the administrations and secretariats are often financed by funds, 
etc., that were originally created by public means. Hence, as a result, the affiliation 
percentage in the agricultural sector is considerable above that of wage-earners. 
Additionally, the costs of acquiring political influence have been minimised among farmers 
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resources in time and money. This elite group dominates the national agricultural interest 
organizations and, to an even greater extent, the farmers’ Community-level organization, 
the Comité des Organizations Professionnelles Agricoles de la CEE (COPA). Some would 
argue that the design of the CAP – even after the latest reform (cf. OECD, 2004) – is a 
reflection of this fact, i.e. that the CAP benefit the biggest farmers the most. 
 
Another explanation of the agricultural sector’s organizational strength relates as 
mentioned earlier in the article to the economic conditions to which farmers are subject. 
The constant pressure on incomes makes it easy for agricultural organizations to create a 
basic consensus and socially construct a well-defined goal to improve the incomes through 
protectionism, public price support or direct financial support.  
 
One interpretation of this phenomenon is that the farmers find it legitimate and attractive to 
invest in political lobbyism in order to compensate for the situation that the agricultural 
sector does not benefit from the introduction of new technology because the benefit from 
the introduction of new technology in agriculture is externalised (i.e. this externality is a 
benefit which is not subject to market transactions between the farmer and the consumer). 
Lobbyism aims to ensure that the costs of introducing new technology are externalised as 
well. On the other hand, bad economic conditions are far from being an adequate 
explanation for the costly agricultural policies all over the industrialised world. In the retail 
sector, for example, incomes are often on average as low as those in the farming sector. 
However, the retail sector has proved itself very unsuccessful in getting support through the 
public budgets. The reason for this difference is partly that the organizational costs in the 
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incentives in the retail sector which are necessary in order to participate in a collectively 
beneficial activity like being organized in a strong interest organization. 
  
The farmers of the Member States can be divided along the following lines: 1) small 
farmers versus large farmers, 2) vegetable producers versus animal producers, 3) producers 
of ‘Northern’ products (milk, grain, beef) versus producers of ‘Southern’ products (olive 
oil, wine, fruits), and  4)the farmers from the “old” Member States versus farmers from the 
“new” Member States. Nevertheless, the preferences at both EU and national levels are 
similar enough to safeguard a strong common appearance. The reason is that, as a general 
rule, conflicts are avoided by using the principle of the ‘highest common denominator’. In 
other words, it seems possible for the group of farmers of the European Union to upgrade 
their common interests in their lobbyism vis-á-vis the European decision-makers. 
 
While farmers can be regarded as demanders of agricultural support and interventions, the 
demand of the consumers and taxpayers is expected to pull in the opposite direction. In 
other words, farmers are expected to be supporters of agricultural protectionism and 
subsidies, while consumers and taxpayers are expected to be opponents of agricultural 
protectionism and subsidies.  
 
In this light, the actual level of protectionism can be regarded – according to the proposed 
theoretical model - as a function of the investment made in political influence on behalf of 
the farmers and consumers/taxpayers respectively. The result is assumed to be an 
equilibrium situation between opponents and supporters of agricultural expenditures and 
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the marginal costs, of the investments made in political influence.  
 
The equilibrium situation in the agricultural political market is asymmetric because the 
farmers are able to press the slope of their lobby-curve downwards due to the selective 
incentives (see also Ballisacan and Roumasset, 1987). That is, for example, not the case for 
firms in the retail sector. As a result the farmers are ‘over-motivated’ to use money and 
time to further their collective interests which is reflected in agricultural protectionism and 
subsidies to the agricultural sector. The potential opponents of the farmers are consumers 
and taxpayers, but they are seldom organised at all. Besides, the marginal benefit of 
opposing the farmers resulting from lower taxes and consumer prices is very limited among 
a great number of consumers and taxpayers.  
 
Therefore, the political decision-makers assume that consumers and taxpayers stay 
relatively calm and indifferent when import tariffs are introduced, food prices are kept well 
above the world market level, and farmers are subsidized. Farmers, on the other hand, often 
see the benefit of investing time and resources in protest meetings, demonstrations, 
attacking trains with imported agricultural products, blocking the roads with tractors, 
burning tyres, etc., if the import limitations, direct income support and export funds are 
conceived as unsatisfactory (see also Olson, 1982). A factor that might pull in the opposite 
direction is, perhaps, the increasing environmental awareness which puts independent but, 
until now only comparatively weak pressure upon the decision-makers in the agricultural 
policy arena. However, at the same time, in recent years, the suplliers as well as demanders 
of agricultural support have managed to redefine parts of the agricultural subsidies as 
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the European Union from May 1, 2004, have put pressure on the CAP, but exactly because 
of the asymmetry on the European agricultural policy market, one should not expect a 
radical change of CAP due to the enlargement. 
 
8. Government failures and the supply side: Politicians and bureaucrats  
The farmers strong interest organizations (relative to other sectors) and the consumers’ and 
tax payers’ relatively weak interest organizations are necessary conditions for political 
decisions being pro-agricultural in a status quo perspective. Besides, political decision-
makers (politicians and bureaucrats) are required to be willing to fulfil the wishes of 
farmers to a smaller or larger extent.  
In this context, it is a widespread notion that politicians and bureaucrats in a democratic 
society make decisions reflecting the wishes, attitudes and preferences of the people, in 
particular, the political goals that are common among a majority within the electorate and 
that these decisions are assumed to make up the foundation of the political decisions of 
society.  
 
According to the rational choice theory, however, the existence of such correspondence 
between the democratic, collective decisions and policy objectives based on individual 
preferences is a much too optimistic, although long lasting, democratic theory. Because the 
gain from limiting agricultural expenditures or agricultural protectionism is spread 
collectively among all taxpayers and consumers, extraordinary incentives are needed to 
mobilise taxpayers and consumers in the political process. In the same way, costs of the 
expansion of expenditures or of protectionism have to be paid by all taxpayers and 
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consumers. Their loosely organised groups, however, are confronted with a smaller, but 
much more homogeneous group of farmers who enjoy the benefits of an expansion of the 
agricultural expenditures or protectionism and who are hurt by a cut in agricultural 
expenditures or free trade. The gains and losses of this group are concentrated and private 
in character.  
 
Generally, it is predicted that the resistance against consumer-financed support is less 
intensive than against taxpayer-financed support because higher prices as a result of 
protectionism are more difficult to blame on agricultural lobbyism than higher taxes. As a 
result, farmers are normally in favour of price support measures. On the other hand, 
taxpayer-financed support is more acceptable if the measures have an “objective” character 
based on discretionary and bureaucratic criteria. Besides, the fact that taxpayer financed 
support through the CAP originates from the EU agricultural fund which is again financed 
by Member States’ contribution to the EU budget means that the connection between taxes 
paid in Member States and the CAP expendituresis not very clear for many tax payers. 
Hence, one should not expect a much stronger pressure against subsidies paid by 
consumers than subsidies paid by taxpayers in the European Union. 
 
At the same time, because of the marginal impact of rising and decreasing agricultural 
protectionism or budgetary expenditures, electorates in general have no incentives to have a 
specific interest in CAP. The individual farmer, however, has an income which is more or 
less a function of political decisions. His motive for influencing the policy is therefore very 
strong. Agricultural organizations will gather information about what political 
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bother to keep themselves informed on these matters. Hence, it is no wonder that 
politicians are tempted to pay specific attention to the interests of agriculture.  
 
Normally, politicians decide on a political issue according to how voters will react. Voters, 
on the other hand, have to consider the costs in time and money when they form their 
preferences and transmit them to the politicians. If the voter is a little rational, a minimum 
of benefits for him is necessary if he wants to pay the costs of collecting information and 
transmitting preferences to the political decision-makers (Nello 1984). As mentioned 
above, just getting information about the impact and size of public support for agriculture is 
difficult and costly because very often either the support is ”hidden” in the prices or it is 
“hidden” in bureaucratic measures.  
 
In the theory of rational choice - where “the political market” is used as a metaphor - it is 
assumed in the theoretical model that politicians ”supply” political decisions in order to be 
re-elected. According to Winters (1987) re-election depends on the following factors: the 
number of voters affected by the political decisions, how voters are affected by political 
decisions, the political influence of the affected voters, whether or not the politicians regard 
it as acceptable that certain groups of voters get benefits, the possibility that the affected 
group of voters will punish the politicians for a bad political result and whether or not a bad 
political result for an affected group will have an impact on public opinion or not. 
 
Hence, one should expect a falling willingness of politicians to supply the farmers with 
agricultural subsidies and protectionism as the number of farmers decline. Especially in 
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agricultural organizations is more important than indicated by the actual number of votes of 
the agricultural sector. The reason is that supporting agriculture gives politicians a base for 
attracting non-agricultural votes from rural areas. Also, in general, the agricultural 
organizations have a high political profile because an important part of the farmers’ 
incomes stems from political rent-seeking. This means that the basic condition for the 
survival of farmers and farmers’ organizations is to be found in the creation of public 
awareness. Politicians with a friendly attitude towards agricultural interests will benefit 
from this. Additionally, in most developed countries, rural areas are over-represented 
through the electoral system, i.e. there is an institutional bias towards agricultural interests 
within the political system.  
 
Alongside the politicians, the bureaucrats are important suppliers of agricultural decisions. 
In the rational choice theory it is assumed – even though politicians formally take the 
political decisions under counselling by the administration – that bureaucrats are also 
independent actors who are maximising utility by preserving or expanding their power 
base, their career possibilities etc. In the agricultural area, bureaucrats probably have quite 
a considerable amount of influence in the agricultural policy area because this area is 
characterised by a lot of technicalities and many specific rules. A result of the technical 
character of agricultural policy is that politicians avoid dealing directly with the many 
regulatory and distributive questions in agricultural policy. When political decisions are 
transformed into quasi-political and bureaucratic-technical questions, agricultural policy 
takes on a seemingly objective character. Not least the Common Agricultural Policy has 
given national bureaucrats an institutionalised influence in making regulations through a 
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bureaucrats making the inputs to the political process an extremely large amount of 
influence (Winters 1987). All else being equal, one must therefore expect that bureaucrats 
in the agricultural decision-making process prefer agricultural reform which uses 
bureaucratic instruments instead of a liberalisation or a market orientation of the 
agricultural policy which would reduce the need for bureaucratic interventions and 
bureaucrats in general. 
 
Normally, in the rational choice theory, it is often assumed that bureaucrats involved in the 
agricultural decision making process gain no immediate benefits from the political 
decisions taken. As mentioned above, the major implicit goals of agro-bureaucrats are to 
increase their power bases, responsibilities, staff, and career possibilities. These goals are 
best achieved the more complex and technical the agricultural policy is, and the more 
important agriculture is as a economic sector, the more agriculture is governed politically 
rather than by market forces. Therefore, in general, agro-bureaucrats are expected to 
oppose change in agricultural policy if it involves strong market orientation, less support 
for agriculture and a smaller agricultural sector. Bureaucrats must even be expected to be 
more in favour of continuing and building up agricultural protectionism than agro-
politicians because they gain fewer benefits from taking general national or European 
economic and political considerations into account. Bureaucrats can normally only be 
expected to move away from the agricultural protectionist line if the present agricultural 
policy directly weakens their relationships with other parts of the administration. For 
example, the Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture has for years been pressing 
for a moderate reform of the CAP because continuation of the former line was creating an 
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external actors outside of the Commission. In particular, the agricultural policy has been 
damaging the international relations of the European Union and its reputation in general.  
 
In the agricultural policy area, the general asymmetry which – according to the rational 
choice theory - is always present in collective political decisions, is sharpened by the 
“suppliers” who have independent reasons for reinforcing a complicated, protectionist 
“super asymmetric” agricultural policy. However, a stronger reflection of individual 
preferences could be achieved by limiting the general asymmetry of political decisions and 
by limiting asymmetry that is specific to agriculture. Generally, in the rational choice 
theory it is recommended to set up institutions in order to put restraints on the utility 
maximising actors whether they are interest groups or Member States. These institutions 
should be designed in order to bring about a larger degree of correlation between the 
particular interests and the common interests. In the CAP, one way of doing so could be to 
strengthen the horizontal political element in the now very “segmented”, technical and 
highly complex agricultural decision-making process. This can be done by letting other 
politicians, rather than agro-politicians alone, participate in the agricultural decision-
making process. Increasingly, this is also what is happening, especially in the form of the 
European Council meetings which have in recent years sometimes played the role of 
counterweight to the agricultural policy-making process, not least in cases of major reform 
initiatives with regard to the agricultural policy and the EU budget.  
 
The European Parliament is also a horizontal political element in the European decision-
making process. In the constitution adopted in June 2004 (but not yet ratified) the 
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the decision-making procedure concerning CAP as far as legislation and budgets are 
concerned.  The problem is, however, that the Parliament is long away from playing the 
role of an active counter-weight at the European level to the specific sector interests. Until 
now the Parliament has normally always taking a very positive stance concerning all kinds 
of European legislation and European political initiatives in order to increase its European 
power base. At the same time, the parliamentarians have no power to tax citizens and 
companies and, therefore, are never held responsible for increasing budgetary expenditures 
because of the CAP. A more radical way to reduce the asymmetric characteristics of the 
CAP would be to renationalise the CAP or part of the CAP. Then, of course, European 
integration would loose the potential neofunctionalist spill-overs from the CAP to other 
policy areas. On the other hand, one could argue that these spill-overs (to the customs 
union, the internal market, the economic and monetary union, etc.) have already been 
exploited. At the same time, it is difficult to identify from where the decisive pressure 
could come from in order to bring about such a renationalisation of the CAP. Another way 
of making the asymmetric agricultural policy less asymmetric is by setting certain 
constraints on, for example, the EU budget for agricultural policy. Such ceilings have also 
been decided at the EU level by the European Council. The problem, however, is that the 
support for the agricultural sector can take many other forms than what can be seen on the 
budgets, and that the budgetary discipline decided upon is not always followed in practise. 
 
All in all, it is very difficult to come up with “institutional solutions” in order to 
fundamentally change the CAP. Hence, in general, according to the proposed theoretical 
model, fundamental changes of the Common Agricultural Policy are expected only to come 
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the various interests embedded in the CAP can only be “deconstructed” in any significant 
extent if and when the CAP comes under fire from strong political players outside of the 
European Union. 
   
9. Conclusion 
The aim of this article is to propose a theoretical model of the Common Agricultural Policy 
of the European Union which should be able to give an understanding of an issue or a 
process, have an explanatory power and be able to predict events, be consistent and 
coherent, cover the full scope of the research object and have a capacity for self-reflection 
and engagement with contending theories. 
 
The proposed theoretical model is an interdisciplinary model drawing on elements from 
economics and political science. As argued by North (1990:5), such a theory should build 
on individual choices because this theoretical approach is logically consistent, and because 
it can, by integrating individual choices with institutional constraints, serve as a major step 
toward unifying various social science theories. Hence, methodological individualism is a 
starting point of the proposed theoretical model. 
 
The next point of departure for the proposed theoretical model for the CAP is the existence 
of a number of market failures when market failures are seen in a broad perspective. The 
market failures here cover certain characteristics of the supply and demand of agricultural 
goods as well as some peculiar characteristics as far as the production of agricultural 
products is concerned. Among other things, a result of the peculiarities of agricultural 
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which means that farmers have a potential interest to organise themselves in order to 
become political rent-seekers. In their efforts to organise themselves the farmers are helped 
by their perennial income problems and homogenous preferences. This is the foundation 
for their ”logic of collective action”.  
 
At the same time, normally, the farmers have great success in avoiding ‘free-riding’, which 
is always a problem when interests are organised. This is due to the existence of a number 
of selective incentives. Besides, politicians and bureaucrats are motivated to supply farmers 
with public support. Still, the expected opponents of agricultural support, i.e. consumers 
and taxpayers, are too weakly organised and too little interested in making any forceful 
counterweight to farmers and agricultural politicians.  
 
The general asymmetry between farmers and consumers is sharpened in the CAP because it 
is possible to push the costs of expansion of agricultural production to other Member States 
and countries outside the European Union. At the same time, many of the institutionalised 
counter-weights that exists at the national level, are either very weak or do not exists at the 
European level. This is why the political system of the European Union could be 
characterised as a “super asymmetric” political system as far as agricultural policy 
decisions are concerned. 
 
The proposed theoretical model of the CAP is not “tested” in this article, however, such a 
test has some rather clear success criteria, for example, the predictions on the basis of the 
theoretical model are a) that the European Union has large obstacles that are almost 
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level of support to the agricultural sector is very difficult to bring down in a reform process 
meaning that a reduction of one kind of support will probably lead to a shift to another kind 
of support and c) that there is a structural tendency to increasing bureaucratisation of the 
CAP as it changes due to, for example, external pressures and d) that the resistance from 
the tax payers and consumers vis-à-vis the protectionism and subsidizing of farmers will be 
relatively small. 
 
Some would argue that the proposed theory is somewhat “autistic” as it is build on a 
specific set of assumptions, which, if accepted, automatically lead to the next step in the 
theoretical model. Some might criticize that the proposed theoretical model leaves almost 
no room for, for example, a reform process based on ideals and principles. Others might 
criticize that fundamental changes of the CAP can not happen due to rational entrepreneurs 
within the European Union like the Commission. 
 
At the same time, even though the proposed theoretical model is very much in accordance 
with the basic assumptions of neo-classical economic theory, and, therefore, should be no 
stranger to economists and political scientist, there might some truth in the criticism. There 
is a danger that theories are simply written off because they do not fit with the basic 
assumptions of the rational choice based theoretical model of the CAP. This might be a 
hindrance of self-reflection and self-critique. Therefore, the proposed theoretical model of 
the CAP should be used with an open mind in order to integrate insights from other 
theoretical schools. 
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